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**The Asymmetric Response to Network-Centric “Lock-Out” Strategies and the
Escalation of Violence**

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**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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09 February 2004

Abstract

As the world’s sole superpower, the United States will operate in an asymmetric environment for the foreseeable future. This asymmetric environment is ultimately defined by perceived differences in the will and means of the United States in relation to its opponents. Unable to compete with the United States militarily, the asymmetric enemy perceives his will to fight as his competitive edge. These perceptions underwrite enemy strategies aimed at eroding U.S. will to fight by exploiting what the enemy believes is a U.S. aversion to casualties.

To deal with this emerging challenge, the U.S. military is adopting an effects-based approach aimed at striking the adversary’s will to fight. Acting quickly and decisively, effects-based strategies strive to “lock-out” or foreclose alternate enemy courses of action. However, the enemy’s reaction must be considered as the operational commander employs these strategies. Given the opponent’s dwindling opportunity for military action as a result of a “lock-out” strategy, he may be expected to escalate the level of violence on an increasing compressed timeline.

Asymmetric enemies may be expected to strike preemptively to dissuade or complicate U.S. military action. The use of force may be directed at U.S. military targets to increase U.S. casualties, or at other U.S. “opponents” to complicate or deter U.S. military involvement. To mitigate the effects of these enemy counter-efforts, the operational commander must focus on effective operational protection and accurate identification of enemy courses of action during the planning process.

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INTRODUCTION

The United States stands alone as the world's sole superpower in an increasingly globalized world. This motivates U.S. involvement in all corners of the earth to ensure the "political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity"¹ essential to its prosperity. Although unmatched militarily, the United States continues to face threats from potential adversaries who are adapting to this new balance of power. These adversaries seek to avoid direct confrontation with U.S. military superiority while exploiting its weaknesses. In hopes of dissuading or deterring U.S. military operations or intervention, foes embark upon drastically different methodologies aimed at perceived U.S. strategic vulnerabilities.² The U.S. military must adapt to counter these asymmetric challenges.

In dealing with these challenges, the U.S. military is moving from the traditional attrition based method of fighting toward an effects-based approach. This approach aims to strike directly at an adversary's will to oppose the United States without completely destroying his physical means to resist.³ Whether titled Effects-Based Operations, Network-Centric Warfare, or Rapid Decisive Operations, the concept is universal -- act early and decisively enough to eliminate or "lock-out" alternate enemy courses of action, thereby removing his will to resist and compelling him to comply with U.S. demands. However, given the current global asymmetric security environment in which potential adversaries depend more upon their will than their means to resist, enemy reaction to this strategy is of significant concern. Therefore, this paper argues that the U.S. operational commander must be prepared to deal with the long-term and often unpredictable effects associated with applying "lock-out" strategies in an asymmetric environment. This paper describes the

asymmetric environment in terms of operational art, examines the long-term effects a “lock-out” strategy may have in this environment, and recommends courses of action to mitigate their effects.

THE NATURE OF THE ASYMMETRIC ENVIRONMENT

One must understand the asymmetric environment in order to understand the long-term effects any potential strategy may have. Yet, there is much debate over the definition and use of the term “asymmetry” as it applies to modern warfare. It is a term that has been used to describe tactics, strategy, and disparity in forces in an effort to qualify the threats that the United States now faces. Some argue that “asymmetry,” as it is used today, seems to be “formless and shifting” and attempts to analyze the security environment in its terms prove elusive.⁴ However, by understanding the relationship between the relative wills and means of the combatants, it is possible to understand the strategies that they adopt, and ultimately, today’s asymmetric environment.

Simplistic definitions of an asymmetric threat or strategy serve as general guidelines, but are insufficient to analyze effectively the security environment. For example, asymmetric warfare, as defined by one author, is:

a set of operational practices aimed at negating advantages and exploiting vulnerabilities rather than engaging in traditional force-on-force engagements. The incentive to engage in asymmetric warfare is usually greatest for the weakest party in defense against a stronger (and often extra-regional) foe.⁵

This definition emphasizes the concept of “negating advantages and exploiting vulnerabilities,” although such are inherent to almost any conflict. Attacking an enemy’s weakness while avoiding his strength does not necessarily qualify as an asymmetric approach, nor does it define the true nature of asymmetric conflict.

The true nature of an asymmetric environment may be defined by contrasting the strategies each competitor adopts. These strategies are related directly to the wills and means of each belligerent in relation to one another. It is easy to think of historical asymmetric examples in terms of differing means such as quantity and types of forces, or levels of training. However, it is essential to recognize the role of differing wills, for together with differing means, they “shape the mechanics [strategies] of the conflict.”⁶ These relative strategies define the nature of the war and help differentiate between symmetric and asymmetric environments.

Historically, symmetric warfare has involved adversaries whose relative means and wills to engage in armed conflict were roughly matched. The First and Second World Wars are prime examples.⁷ In these conflicts, one side sufficiently destroying his enemy’s means so that he could then impose his will on that enemy ultimately defined victory. This resulted in both opponents embarking on attritive strategies to destroy each others’ forces and capability to resist. History suggests that the more capable and determined the combatants tend to be, the more the conflict develops into a symmetric war of attrition.⁸ This symmetric environment can change dramatically as the capabilities and determination of the belligerents differ.

As the means and wills of the opponents begin to diverge, the asymmetric environment develops. Clausewitz stated that an enemy’s power could be expressed as the product of his means and will to fight. Furthermore, he stated that while the “physical [means] seem little more than the wooden hilt . . . the moral factors [will] are the finely-honed blade.”⁹ A contemporary expression of this is described by one author as the

“Probability Equation.” It states that:

$$\text{Probability of Success} = \text{Means} \times \text{Will}^2$$
¹⁰

Simply stated, to engage an enemy possessing superior means it is necessary to employ superior will, which can have disproportionate effects in leveling the playing field. The opponent of lesser means then sees his advantage over the stronger as “superior will to fight”¹¹ and the nature of the war changes with the strategies of the belligerents. Asymmetry then results as the party of superior means fights a war of attrition, and the lesser a war of wills.

In the past, this asymmetry in strategy has proved effective for weaker nations and has helped shape the current strategic environment. The North Vietnamese were able to achieve their strategic objective of eliminating U.S. support of South Vietnam by adopting an asymmetric strategy. This strategy centered on involving the United States in a protracted war to undermine U.S. will to support South Vietnam,¹² while the United States embarked upon conventional land warfare to attrite North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. Similar success was enjoyed by the Mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.¹³ While both conflicts did involve conventional engagements, the weaker adversary did not achieve his ends by eliminating the enemy’s means to continue the fight, but by eliminating the enemy’s will to fight.

While asymmetric warfare inevitably involves belligerents seeking to avoid their opponent’s strengths and exploit weaknesses, the heart of the matter lies in the contrast of belligerent wills and means. U.S. superiority nearly guarantees that any potential aggressor will be unable to compete in a conventional, symmetric force-on-force engagement. This

imbalance of means necessitates the adversary's reliance upon superior will to achieve his desired end state.

DESIRED END STATE – THE ASYMMETRIC PERSPECTIVE

An enemy of the United States normally will seek a desired end state wherein there exists no U.S. influence in the environment of principal interest to that enemy. Unable to match the U.S. militarily, hope lies in convincing the United States to change its policies or suspend military operations in the area. Osama bin Laden's policy objectives, as laid out in his 1996 *fatwa*, are a good example of this. While it appears that bin Laden rails against Western culture, he consistently addresses policy issues aimed at altering or eliminating U.S. presence in the Middle East.¹⁴ He does not seek totally to destroy U.S. forces worldwide or to destroy Western culture, but seeks to change the status quo. This desired end state permits an enemy of lesser means to compete with the United States, as it does not necessitate a complete destruction of U.S. forces. While some physical engagement of forces will occur, it allows the militarily weaker opponent to bring to bear what he perceives as his superior will to fight.

U.S. CRITICAL FACTORS – THE ASYMMETRIC PERSPECTIVE

For the potential asymmetric opponent, the identification of enemy strengths and weaknesses is self-evident in his struggle with the United States. He can easily identify that he is no military match for the United States, and sees this capability as the U.S. critical strength. Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have strengthened this perception and direct engagement with the United States is now considered "lunacy."¹⁵ Strategically, the United States draws its strength from a robust economy, stable government, vast natural resources, and the support of its democratic pluralistic society.¹⁶ As Winston

Churchill noted, the United States is like “a giant boiler” whose power is limitless once “the fire is lit.”¹⁷ However, some U.S. actions have led potential competitors to believe that the public support necessary for prolonged American military operations is open to attack and thus a critical weakness.

History suggests to potential enemies that U.S. decision makers are casualty adverse. It is believed that the United States wants “no more Vietnams” where its men and women “die in unconscionable numbers”¹⁸ as evidenced by U.S. actions in places such as Beirut, Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo.¹⁹ This has led prospective adversaries to conclude that victory is possible if enough U.S. casualties can be exacted.²⁰ Indeed, initial Iraqi strategy during Operation *Iraqi Freedom* was centered on this perception.²¹ Because any given enemy has the ability to cause significant U.S. casualties, the enemy perception is that U.S. casualty intolerance is a critical vulnerability to be exploited against the U.S. center of gravity.

U.S. CENTER OF GRAVITY – THE ASYMMETRIC PERSPECTIVE

Centers of gravity exist at all levels of war, are the “first” of critical strengths, and “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”²² Operationally, the U.S. notional center of gravity is some form of military capability. The United States can bring this overwhelming power to bear anywhere in the world, but its source is ultimately the will of the democratic society that underwrites it. This is the U.S. strategic center of gravity.²³ Unable to affect or degrade seriously the U.S. operational center of gravity, an asymmetric enemy looks to the U.S. strategic center of gravity to achieve its desired end state. It sees the perceived U.S. aversion to casualties as a means of affecting this center of gravity, and pursues actions to that end.

As a result, the asymmetric enemy adopts a strategy not to defeat directly the U.S. military, but to exact relatively small tolls over time, inflicting a “death by a thousand cuts.”²⁴ The enemy believes he has a superior will to fight, indulging a willingness to employ any means at his disposal. These can include terror tactics, weapons of mass destruction, and human shields, wherein the U.S. cannot or will not respond in kind.²⁵ The ensuing asymmetric conflict, ultimately the product of differences in will and means, is driving new concepts of operations, and is something the United States has been slow to recognize.

THE U.S. SOLUTION AND NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

In an effort to adapt to the current security environment, the United States is attempting to transform the “American way of war.” This transformation is moving the U.S. military towards an effects-based approach.²⁶ This approach is aimed at affecting the will of the enemy, rather than his means to fight, through rapid and decisive actions that quickly foreclose alternative courses of action. In the U.S. Navy vernacular, network-centric warfare attempts to “lock-out” alternate enemy strategies by neutralizing him or making his actions ineffective. To achieve these ends, functions such as information superiority and speed of command are leveraged to conduct non-linear operations in which “small actions [have] very great, disproportionate effects.”²⁷ However, as the United States transforms itself and the “American way of war,” the counter-efforts of potential competitors must be considered.

Arthur Cebrowski, director of U.S. Department of Defense transformation, admits that the rise of current asymmetric strategies is a reaction to an increasingly powerful U.S. military.²⁸ It stands to reason that potential competitors will continue to react to what is sure to be perceived as continuing expansion of U.S. power. One expert contends that physical

actions influence behavior in two ways. First, “physical actions create physical effects” that can limit an enemy’s freedom of action and therefore influence his behavior. Second, and more importantly, these physical actions are observed by others and influence the way in which they will behave in the future.²⁹ Potential competitors certainly have observed the actions of the United States in the last decade, and are continuing to adjust their strategies accordingly. This becomes increasingly critical as U.S. effect-based strategies, such as “lock-out,” attempt to curtail the will to fight that asymmetric competitors see as their edge.

Many cascading effects can be expected with a shift in U.S. military strategy. Asymmetric enemies may be expected to react by adopting strategies that are backed by a perceived superior will to fight and a readiness to use all means available. Some of these enemy counter-efforts will be predictable, but some will not. Therefore, as the U.S. military begins to implement network-centric “lock-out” strategies, it must be prepared to deal with anticipated enemy reactions and, more importantly, the unanticipated.

THE ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE

In its rise to global power, the United States has seen many asymmetric tactics used against it. It has seen protracted conflict and “the death by a thousand cuts,”³⁰ the blurring of combatant and non-combatant distinction, the use of human shields, and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Although effects-based operations hope to curtail these actions, such “traditional” asymmetric strategies are likely to continue. Sun Tzu cautioned, “Do not press an enemy at bay, [for] if they know there is no alternative, they will fight to the death.”³¹ To an asymmetric enemy an effects-based strategy designed to destroy his will to fight offers “no alternative.” This will be reflected in the enemy’s course of action.

U.S. military planning guidance categorizes enemy courses of actions as defending, reinforcing, attacking, withdrawing, or delaying type actions.³² Given U.S. military dominance, opponents will conclude that some of these alternatives are futile or unacceptable. Defending, reinforcing and delaying actions are not promising because they infer eventual confrontation with “massed”³³ U.S. force – something asymmetric opponents wish to avoid. Withdrawing would cede victory and be ultimately unacceptable to an enemy who perceives an advantage over the United States, in this case, superior determination. The overwhelming U.S. military capability and effects-based approach puts the asymmetric enemy and his perceived superior will to fight on “death ground.” The attack becomes the only option.

THE PREDICTABLE

Non-linear operations, in which small actions can have huge effects, are becoming a U.S. military hallmark. Consider the use of precision-guided munitions. These enable tactical units to strike with accuracy and sufficient lethality to achieve operational and even strategic effects. So effective are current munitions that symmetric competitors, such as Russia, now consider a nuclear response to a conventional precision attack reasonable³⁴ as they have no other means of responding effectively. In an asymmetric environment, the threat of U.S. military power implies a similar effect.

Asymmetric enemies undoubtedly see the strategic effects the U.S. can achieve with minimal effort. This is something for which they have no like response. To achieve their own strategic effect, they must rely upon increasing the cost, in terms of casualties, beyond what the United States is willing to pay. However, as their opportunities to cause such casualties will quickly diminish with U.S. intervention, opponents realize that they must act

sooner and with greater lethality. Recent experimentation reveals the weaker enemy's proclivity towards violent preemption.

Unified Quest 2003, a U.S. Joint Forces Command war game conducted after the main effort of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, illustrated that potential opponents may use conventional and nuclear weapons in pre-emptive modes to further their anti-access strategies and increase casualty figures.³⁵ As U.S. capability to foreclose enemy courses of action continues to expand in scope and time, it can be expected that an asymmetric enemy will engage the United States sooner. Furthermore, given fewer opportunities to strike at the United States it is likely these attacks will be conducted more violently. Exacerbated by the current trend of technology proliferation that may equip potential enemies with weapons of mass destruction,³⁶ asymmetric opponents may be expected to escalate the level of violence on an increasingly compressed timeline in hopes of increasing casualties and eroding U.S. public support.

THE UNPREDICTABLE

The enemy's pre-emptive use of violent force is of concern, but of no surprise; *Unified Quest 2003* indicates as much. However, in this simulation, the pre-emptive action was taken against U.S. forces in hopes of dissuading further military action.³⁷ Given the nature of effects-based operations, and the information dominance they require, it is unlikely that these pre-emptive actions against the U.S. will be effective.³⁸ Enemies will certainly realize this and may look to alternative targets to achieve their ends, if not to prevent U.S. military action, then at least to make its use more complicated. As network-centric strategies limit the effectiveness of an early escalation of violence against U.S. forces, asymmetric

opponents may look to expand the scope of conflict by involving “third parties” in hopes of complicating or dissuading U.S. military action.

Enemies seeking to expand the scope of conflict are nothing new. Operation *Desert Storm* demonstrated this as Iraq launched *Scud* missiles into Israel in hopes of embroiling the entire region in conflict and decreasing the chances of U.S. success.³⁹ As a result, many air sorties were “siphon[ed] off” and re-allocated to the “great Scud hunt” in an effort to dissuade Israel from entering the war.⁴⁰ In the end Iraq’s strategy was ineffective, but it did demonstrate the ability of an adversary to complicate U.S. military action through expanding the scope of the war. However, it is important to note that the Iraqi action was directed at a U.S. ally and it was this relationship that allowed the United States ultimately to thwart Iraq’s strategy.⁴¹ This raises the question, could an asymmetric enemy be more effective by directing his action against those who do not have such cordial relations with the United States?

Although the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” has influenced many state relationships throughout history, its relevancy may be decreasing in the modern security environment. As the asymmetric enemy considers how best to use his dwindling military opportunities, he may realize he could benefit more from an attack on a U.S. “opponent” than from an attack on U.S. forces. To illustrate this, consider the effects of an Iraqi attack on Iran or North Korea during the build-up to Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. Although the feasibility of these actions is arguable, they illustrate the potential efficacy of the strategy.

The prospective Iranian reaction is troubling for U.S. forces. Given the quarrelsome history between Iran and Iraq, it is likely that the Iranians would have responded with some form of military action. The potential for Iranian forces to be operating in close proximity to

the sizeable U.S. force in the region would increase greatly the complexity of U.S. operations. The United States undoubtedly would have modified its course of action in an effort to avoid a confrontation with Iranian forces. While both Iran and the United States could be seeking similar fates for the Iraqi regime, the tensions between the countries would limit, if not nullify, any cooperation. Though this strategy may not have caused the United States to suspend military operations in the area, it may have given pause enough to mitigate the effectiveness of a “lock-out” strategy and better the asymmetric enemy’s chances for survival, if not complete victory.

Similarly, an Iraqi attack on North Korea would have complicated U.S. military action. It is uncertain what reaction North Korea would have toward aggression from someone other than traditional enemies, but almost any action would have necessitated some form of U.S. response. Given the already “tense” situation in the region,⁴² the posturing of North Korean and U.S. forces would have been enough to demand significant U.S. attention. Although theoretically prepared to fight conflicts on these two fronts,⁴³ escalating tensions in the area and the potential two-front scenario may have been reason enough to reevaluate U.S. military action in Iraq. U.S. military power would be stretched to its limit and the looming prospect of U.S. casualties would have certainly swayed public opinion.

Although both of these Iraqi strategies are highly speculative, their impact on American military operations is evident. Further, while it might seem unrealistic to suggest overt Iraqi action against Iran or North Korea, it is much less unrealistic to suggest covert action that could be blamed on someone else, notably the United States or U.S. ally. Thus, if an asymmetric enemy can increase the complexity of the equation sufficiently for the United States, his chances for survival increase. By introducing “third party” non-friendly forces to

complicate U.S. military operations, or by drawing U.S. military attention to other troubled regions of the world, the asymmetric enemy would seek to erode the benefits of the U.S. “lock-out” strategy or dissuade U.S. military intervention. It is apparent that in the current security environment, the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my enemy” may be more *apropos*.

CONCLUSIONS

The implementation of a network-centric “lock-out” strategy in the asymmetric environment may be expected to precipitate early escalation of violence. The asymmetric enemy will learn that his opportunities for military action quickly dwindle in light of a U.S. effects-based approach. Driven by a perceived superior will to fight, he will use any means available to strike preemptively to dissuade or complicate U.S. military action. This use of force may be directed at U.S. military targets to increase U.S. casualties, or at other U.S. “opponents” to complicate or deter U.S. military involvement.

The asymmetric enemy will use these strategies to target the perceived U.S. critical vulnerability and strategic center of gravity. The enemy will attempt to erode American public support by increasing U.S. casualties in preemptive attacks and/or creating the possibility of conflicts on two-fronts. By involving “third party” influences, the adversary will complicate U.S. military operations and negate the efficacy of the U.S. network-centric approach. This would then allow for a more effective implementation of “traditional” asymmetric strategies designed to affect U.S. public support in similar fashion.

By exploiting what it perceives as a U.S. aversion to casualties, the asymmetric enemy tries to capitalize upon what he sees as his superior determination to fight. In the end, these perceived differences in wills determine the asymmetric environment. As the United

States employs effects-based strategies designed to “lock-out” or foreclose alternate enemy strategies, the operational commander must be prepared to deal with the early escalation of violence in order to ensure the success of his strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To mitigate the effects of these asymmetric counter-strategies, the operational commander must focus on effective operational protection and accurate identification of enemy courses of action during the planning process. Although the necessity for operational protection is readily apparent in the symmetric and asymmetric environments, enemy counter-strategies require the operational commander to take a broader view of this function. Not only must the commander be concerned with the effects that factors such as casualties may have on his ability to conduct operations, he must also be concerned with the strategic effects his enemy hopes to achieve with them.

While force protection has been re-emphasized following the terrorist attacks on the *USS Cole* and the World Trade Center, it must remain a central focus. Additionally, rules of engagement must be robust, and commanders must be prepared to authorize or request quickly those supplemental measures essential to increased operational protection.⁴⁴ In achieving more effective operational protection, the combatant commander thus mitigates any effects the enemy hopes to achieve from early preemptive action and U.S. casualties.

Along with operational protection, consideration of the aforementioned enemy strategies must factor into the commander’s planning process. While U.S. effects-based capabilities will be sufficient to deal with enemy counter-efforts, the ability to bring this power to bear depends upon the synthesis of accurate information in the intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Probable preemptive enemy action against U.S. forces now

factors into the planning process as the result of war games such as *Unified Quest 2003*.

However, the possibility for enemy action against non-U.S. forces must also be included in the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) process.

Current U.S. doctrine acknowledges asymmetric warfare considerations in the JIPB and planning process,⁴⁵ but it focuses on specific asymmetric threats that are insufficient to address the strategies described here. Along with the procedures and guidance in each step of the JIPB process, commanders must ensure their staffs recognize and address these additional concerns:

- When defining the battlespace environment, planners must recognize that the enemy's geographic dimensions of the battlespace may extend to other troubled regions of the world. While this will not necessarily lead to an expansion of the joint force's battlespace, it will facilitate a more effective identification of intelligence requirements necessary to identify enemy courses of action that would expand the scope of conflict.
- When describing the battlespace's effects, planners must factor in the possible presence of "third party," non-friendly forces operating in the area. Doing so will allow U.S. planners to develop branch plans that will mitigate the additional operational complexity.
- When evaluating the adversary, planners must recognize the tendency for asymmetric enemies to deviate from known doctrine. Although current U.S. doctrine cautions planners of this possibility as opponents become "desperate,"⁴⁶ added emphasis is needed for reasons discussed in this paper.

- When determining the enemy's courses of action, planners must recognize the true nature of the asymmetric environment. They must recognize the enemy objective and desired end state, as discussed here, and the role a perceived superior will to fight plays in the enemy's decision-making process. These translate into the enemy's acceptance of greater risk, deviation from known doctrine, and the adoption of "wildcard"⁴⁷ courses of action.

While each enemy course of action must finally pass the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability tests, considering these additional factors will allow for an accurate depiction of enemy potential. This awareness will then allow the operational commander to develop courses of action to mitigate enemy counter-efforts. Along with effective operational protection, these additional planning considerations are essential to ensure the effective implementation of U.S. strategies.

NOTES

¹ President of the United States, Proclamation, National Security Strategy, (September 2002), 1.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, (Washington, DC: June 2000), 4-5.

³ Gene Myers, "Concepts to Future Doctrine," A Common Perspective, (April 2002): 6.

⁴ Steven Lambakis, James Kiras, and Kristin Kolet, "Understanding 'Asymmetric Threats to the United States,'" National Institute for Public Policy Publications, September 2002 <<http://www.nipp.org/publications.php>> [10 January 2004].

⁵ Stephen Sloan, "Terrorism and Asymmetry," in Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated?, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 173-174.

⁶ Edward A. Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War (Washington, DC: CCRP), 32.

⁷ Ibid, 31.

⁸ Ibid, 30.

⁹ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1076), 77 & 185.

¹⁰ Smith, 39.

¹¹ Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and the Western Mindset," in Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated?, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 6.

¹² Bui Tin, quoted in "How North Vietnam Won the War," The Wall Street Journal, 3 August 1995, A8.

¹³ Lawrence G. Kelley, "Afghanistan Revisited," Parameters (Spring 2000): 133.

¹⁴ Marc G. Tranchemontagne, "Terrorist Application of Operational Art," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 2002), 4.

¹⁵ P.H. Liotta, "Chaos as Strategy," Parameters, VI. XXXII, No. 2 (Summer 2002): 47.

¹⁶ Tranchemontagne, 5

¹⁷ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1950), 608.

¹⁸ Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the United States Air Force 1947-1997, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 7.

¹⁹ In these three engagements, the U.S. clearly signaled its inability to accept casualties for something less than vital national interests. Troop withdrawals from Beirut in 1984 following the loss of 241 U.S. Marines, and from Somalia following the loss of eighteen U.S. soldiers indicate this directly and have been identified by U.S. adversaries as a sign of weakness (see note 22). In Haiti, a group of lightly armed protestors was enough to prevent the *USS Harlan County* from docking as the Clinton administration, recalling recent events in Somalia, turned the ship away. Michael Bailey, Robert Macguire, J. O'neil G. Pouliot, "Haiti: Military-Police

Partnership for Public Security,” Policing the New World Order: Peace Operations and Public Security, National Defense University Institute for Strategic Studies, May 1998, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Book_titles.htm> [12 January 2004]; Kosovo, while considered a success, also portrays a casualty adverse America. In this instance, the U.S. chose to avoid ground operations in an “other than permissive environment” and opted to use only air power to “cripple” the Serbian army. This indicated that while the U.S. was willing to intervene in the conflict, it was not willing to risk “significant” casualties in high-intensity combat operations. Gordon I. Peterson, “Cohen, Shelton Praise Kosovo Air Campaign; DOD to Review Results of Operation Allied Force,” Sea Power (August 1999): 17; Department of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, (Washington, DC: 2000), xxi.

²⁰ Ken Menkhaus, a Somalia expert from Davidson College, observes that what Bin Laden has learned from U.S. action in Somalia is that if you “kill a few Americans, they go away.” Ken Menkhaus quoted in Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Wrong Lessons of Somalia,” New York Times, 5 February 2002, A-25.

²¹ Captured Iraqi military officers state their aims were to inflict sufficient casualties in order to diminish coalition public support for the war. Saleh Abdullah Mahdi Al Jaburi, quoted in Scott Peterson and Peter Ford, “From Iraqi Officers, Three Tales of Shock and Defeat,” The Christian Science Monitor, (18 April 2003), <<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0418/ps01s03-woiq.htm>> [8 January 2004]

²² Clausewitz, 595; Milan Vego, Operational Warfare (n.p.: n.p. 2000), 309.

²³ Tranchemontagne, 6-7.

²⁴ Sloan, 190.

²⁵ Roger Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc, 2003), 15; quoted in Stephen J. Blank, Rethinking Asymmetric Threats (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 17.

²⁶ Myers, 6.

²⁷ Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 1998): 32; Arthur K. Cebrowski, “Network Centric-Warfare: An Emerging Military Response to the Information Age,” Military Technology (May 2003): 17-18.

²⁸ Arthur K. Cebrowski and Thomas P.M. Barnett, “The American Way of War,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 2003): 42.

²⁹ Smith, 185.

³⁰ Sloan, 190.

³¹ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press), 110.

³² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Joint Pub 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: 24 May 2000), I-3.

³³ Future effects-based concepts no longer rely upon the “traditional” massing of forces. In this context, massed is used to mean the massing of combat power vice forces.

³⁴ Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Technology and the 21st Century Battlefield: Recomplicating Moral Life for the Statesman and the Soldier (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 6.

³⁵ Frank Tibone, “War Game Stuns U.S. Strategists,” DefenseNews, 12 May 2003, 1.

³⁶ Experts agree that advanced military technologies will be “diffused through sales” and despite export control regimes, will be available to “rogue nations.” Sam J. Tangredi, “The Future Security Environment, 2001-2025: Toward a Consensus View,” in QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, ed. Michèle A. Flournoy (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2001): 34-35.

³⁷ Tibone, 1.

³⁸ Cebrowski, “Network Centric-Warfare: An Emerging Military Response to the Information Age,” 22.

³⁹ The United States feared that an Israeli response to Iraq’s attack would bring Jordan into the war as Israeli aircraft might fly over Jordan. It was feared that this would prompt Jordan’s King Hussein to “send his air force to join the fray” which would ultimately result in their defeat. The political upheaval that would follow would most likely lead to the removal of King Hussein’s more moderate regime, and embroil the region in a “war of all against all.” Micheal R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995): 230-231.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 238.

⁴¹ In his book, Bush details the close personal workings he had with Israel’s Yitzak Shamir in his successful efforts to keep Israel out of the war. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1998): 455.

⁴² Lisa Rose Weaver, “N. Korea ‘Admits to Having Nukes,’” CNN.com/World, (23 April 2003), <<http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/24/nkorea.us/>> [01 February 2004].

⁴³ Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Jason Leopold, “U.S. Could Launch Attack Against North Korea While Troops Fight in Iraq, Rumsfeld Says,” The Free Press, (10 March 2003), <<http://www.freepress.org/departments/php/display/12/2003/31>> [01 February 2004].

⁴⁴ Supplemental measures requiring special consideration for approval should be those that allow for more independent action of the tactical commander. The delegation of the authority to declare major attacks as “first of a series” or, more generally, to declare forces hostile are good examples as they may bolster the ability of the tactical commander to provide adequate force protection. This in turn would allow the operational commander to provide adequate operational protection. United States Naval War College, “Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement,” Joint Military Operations Department Readings (Newport, RI: 2003), 13.

⁴⁵ While the four-step JIPB process is entirely applicable to the asymmetric environment, the additional considerations for asymmetric threats listed in Joint Pub 2-01.3 are directed at specific enemy actions. Threats such as offensive IO, concealment and deception, and WMD threats, to mention a few, are worthy of mention, but are too narrow to address the larger strategy of asymmetric enemies. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Joint Pub 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: 24 May 2000), IV-1.

⁴⁶ Ibid, II-55.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

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